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Abstract 
During the summer of 2007, the U.S. residential mortgage market began to decline sharply 
negatively impacting the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market, which often relied 
on mortgages as underlying support. Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs), significant 
investors in commercial paper (CP), quickly retreated from the market, causing a substantial 
decline in outstanding ABCP. In September 2008, pressures on the markets severely 
escalated again, when the Reserve Primary Fund MMMF “broke the buck” and prompted run-
like redemption requests by many MMMF investors. These disruptions resulted in higher 
rates and shorter maturities, practically freezing the market for term CP. Concerned about 
the impacts on the financial system and possible spillover to the greater economy, the 
Federal Reserve (the Fed) invoked its emergency powers to implement (i) the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Mutual Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and the (ii) the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which collectively provided more than $1 trillion 
dollars to MMMFs and CP issuers and helped shore up the ABCP market, preserve the 
MMMFs, and eventually stimulate the CP market. This case discusses the two facilities and 
also demonstrates the interconnectedness between financial markets, the possibility of 
contagion that this creates, and how this proved challenging for the Fed in fighting the crisis. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is one of five Yale Program on Financial Stability case modules considering the Federal 
Reserve’s credit and lending responses to the global financial crisis:  
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response A: Lending & Credit Programs for Depository 
Institutions.  
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response B: Lending & Credit Programs for Primary Dealers. 
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response C: Providing U.S. Dollars to Foreign Central Banks. 
• The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response E: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility.  
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), 
Yale School of Management.   







In August 2007, the decline in the U.S. subprime mortgage market began to spill over and 
infect the interbank wholesale funding markets. Many investors retreated from the U.S. 
funding markets in a “flight to quality.” Because they often utilized mortgage related assets 
as collateral, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) issuers began to experience difficulty 
rolling over their outstanding paper. Outstanding U.S. ABCP dropped by almost $200 billion 
during the month as major investors such as Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs) 
retreated from the market. In September 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund MMMF “broke the 
buck,” (announced a net asset value [NAV] of less than the traditional $1 per share) due to 
losses on a significant position in Lehman Brothers CP after the investment bank filed for 
bankruptcy. Investors, including MMMFs, also began to withdraw from the large market of 
unsecured commercial paper (CP) causing them to all but freeze, especially for maturities 
greater than overnight. 
Since both the ABCP and CP markets were key funding markets for much of the economy, the 
stresses impacting them and the retraction in available liquidity were of great concern to the 
Federal Reserve (the Fed). As the crisis developed, one of its primary goals was to add 
liquidity to compensate for the market contraction in order to maintain the stability of the 
financial system and the functioning of the economy. As a result, the Fed invoked its rarely 
used emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA)4, to 
establish two facilities aimed at shoring-up the ABCP and CP markets (See Figure 1): (i) the 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Mutual Liquidity Facility (AMLF),5 and 
(ii) the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which would be the third largest facility 
implemented by the Fed in response to the crisis. These programs represented a shift in the 
Fed’s policy approach to the crisis because they were a direct effort to backstop a particular 
credit market that was failing. They also represented de facto extensions of the Fed’s 
Discount Window lending to entities that were not depository institutions. 
In this case, we examine these efforts by the Fed to backstop the ABCP and CP markets. 
Section 2 discusses the basics of CP and ABCP, Section 3 discusses the contraction in the CP 
markets and the role of the MMMFs that led to the need for the AMLF and the CPFF, Section 
4 explains the AMLF, while Section 5 describes the CPFF; lastly, Section 6 discusses the Fed’s 
emergency powers under Section 13(3) of the FRA as they existed in 2008. 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4 12 U.S. Code Section 343-Discounts of obligations arising out of actual commercial transactions, as amended.  
5 In November 2008, the Federal Reserve also established the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) 
to provide emergency lending to MMMFs (by making such funding available through banks) so that they would 
be able to respond to increased redemptions without having to sell securities at depressed prices. This facility 
was never used and expired on October 30, 2009. Also see Footnote 19 regarding the Direct Money Market 
Mutual Fund Lending Facility (DMLF), which would have provided direct lending to MMMFs but which was 
rescinded before use.  
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Source: Fleming 2012, Felkerson 2011. 
 
Questions 
1. Why did the AMLF use depository institutions as intermediaries rather than purchase 
ABCP directly from the MMMFs? How did this compare to the structure of the CPFF? 
2. Under the AMLF, the Fed also chose not to apply haircuts to the ABCP purchased, why 
was this and what was the effect of this decision? 
3. What factors do you think the Fed considered in deciding to utilize a SPV to purchase CP 
under the CPFF? 
4. The CPFF was limited to legacy issuers of CP and also limited in the amount of CP that 
was eligible under the program. What was the effect of these limitations? What do you 
think were the policy considerations supporting these features? 
5. How did the Fed determine that the CPFF loans supported by unsecured CP were 
“secured to its satisfaction”? 
6. Did the AMLF and the CPFF effectively complement each other? Were there 
redundancies that could have been avoided? What does the co-existence of these two 
programs reveal about the Fed’s remedy process in fighting the crisis? About how 
markets function? 
 
2. Commercial Paper Explained 
For over a century CP has been a fundamental tool used by financial and nonfinancial 
companies of various sizes to raise funds for basic needs such as payroll, accounts payable, 
118




and inventory financing. CP is usually issued in large denominations of $100,000 or more 
and for maturities of 30 days or less, although it may have a maturity of up to 270 days. CP 
is popular with companies because it is a low-cost alternative to bank loans for financing 
current operations. One reason for its low cost is that it is exempt from registration with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).6 
Commercial Paper Basics 
CP may be unsecured or secured by letters of credit or pools of assets, such as receivables. 
This latter form, called Asset-backed Commercial Paper (ABCP), developed in the 1980s and 
played a key role in the Financial Crisis, as will be discussed below. 
CP is issued at a discount, meaning that the buyer pays less than face value for the security 
and then receives face value at maturity. The difference in the amount paid and face value is 
the interest earned. CP is usually issued in the form of a promissory note and with a specific 
maturity date. CP is considered low risk in part because of its short maturity and is often 
rolled over at maturity with new paper being issued to pay off the outstanding security. 
Interest rates on CP are usually slightly higher than those on Treasury bills (Ibid., 590). (For 
a more complete history of the development of CP, see Anderson and Gascon 2009.) 
In 1970, CP comprised only one-fourth of the dollar volume of money market assets 
outstanding. By 2006, it comprised two-thirds and had developed into a key element of the 
wholesale funding market. (Ibid., 596). Since its introduction, CP has been a fairly stable 
market and there have been only a few defaults of high-quality CP. 
On June 21, 1970, Penn Central7 filed for bankruptcy defaulting on approximately $77.1 
million of its CP and igniting a run in the CP market that caused a decline of $3 billion. As a 
result, the Fed intervened to permit commercial banks to borrow at the discount window. 
After Penn Central, nearly all CP issuers retained backup liquidity lines from commercial 
banks, and rating agencies began to require backup lines for added security. If an issuer 
couldn’t roll the CP, they could borrow the same amount from the bank as long as they were 
still solvent. In the wake of the collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 
1990, many issuers used their backup lines because the CP market for financial firms 
stopped functioning for a couple of months. Thus, the structure of the CP market is to push 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 CP is exempt from SEC registration if the following three criteria are met: (i) the maturity of the paper is less 
than 270 days, (ii) notes must be of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general public, and (iii) issues must 
be used to finance “current transactions” (Anderson and Gascon 2009, 590, Fn3).  
7 It is worth noting that historically CP market problems have stemmed from nonfinancial companies, such as 
Penn Central, PG&E, and Enron, defaulting or being downgraded. What was different about the 2007-09 
financial crisis was that (i) ABCP, which was considered more “stable” because it was collateralized, was 
actually run first, in August 2007, and (ii) it was more than a year later before the run impacted unsecured 
financial CP.  
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all the liquidity risk of CP (ABCP and unsecured) onto the banking system when anything 
goes wrong (Anderson and Gascon 2009). 
As shown in Figure 2, the Fed reported that for most of 2008 that there was a total of $1.8 
trillion in outstanding commercial paper; $763.6 billion was “asset backed,” and $975.4 
billion was not. The overwhelming majority of outstanding CP and ABCP had been issued by 
financial institutions. And as shown on Figure 3, maturities varied although the vast majority 
of CP was issued with maturities of 1-4 days. By December 2009, there were more than 1,700 
companies in the United States that issued commercial paper. 
Outside of the United States, the international Euro-Commercial Paper Market had over $500 
billion outstanding, made up of instruments denominated predominately in euros, dollars 
,and sterling (Anderson and Gascon 2009). 
 
Figure 2: Commercial Paper and Asset-backed Commercial Paper Outstanding, 2006 to 2009 
 
Source: 2015 research stlouisfed.org. 
  
120




Figure 3: Commercial Paper Issuance by Maturity, 2008 (average, $billions) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Volume Statistics for Commercial Paper Issuance. 
 
Figure 4: Commercial Paper Outstanding by Issuer and Placement 
 








Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Beginning in the 1980s, partially as a response to the events of the 1970s, a new type of CP 
began to emerge, ABCP, which was considered more stable than unsecured CP. ABCP 
combined assets into a conduit, a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which then issued the ABCP. 
Use of the SPV permitted a firm to remove the assets from its books for tax purposes. Issuing 
firms sometimes combined different types of assets—credit card receivables with mortgage 
receivables with student loans. When combined this way, however, the ABCP was still being 
issued by one company, and for that reason it was called a “single-seller conduit.” 
Because only the largest companies could afford to develop a distribution network, most CP 
Issuers used agents, or dealers, to place their CP with investors. Most agents were financial 
companies, which also placed their own CP. 
Eventually, companies sponsoring conduits began purchasing assets from other companies, 
which they then combined with their own assets to form a “multi-seller conduit.” Because of 
the combined nature of these asset pools, the rating agencies required that the conduit 
sponsors provide liquidity support, which was often provided by way of a bank-issued letter 
of credit or a guarantee. In the event of a liquidity need, the sponsor would draw on the letter 
of credit or provide direct funding to the conduit SPV. When CP investors began refusing to 
roll over their CP and demanded cash payment instead of accepting new CP as payment, 
issuers faced unexpected liquidity pressures to fund these payments. This would prove to be 
a severe problem for many companies that had sponsored SPVs that were negatively 
impacted by ratings downgrades and devaluations. 
To provide a suitably high rating, rating agencies also required CP Issuers to secure credit-
enhancements to address default risk. To satisfy this requirement, many issuers purchased 
credit default swaps (CDS), a form of insurance in which the purchaser pays premiums for 
the promise of the CDS issuer to pay it an agreed upon sum in the event of default.8 Because 
of the mixed nature of the pools of assets supporting ABCP and CP issued by the multiple-
seller conduits, the ratings of the ABCP they issued came to largely reflect the credit rating 
of the sponsoring entity. This was also a function of the fact that disclosure regarding exactly 
what asset made up an underlying pool was often vague and imprecise. 9 
As shown in Figure 5, ABCP was used to finance consumer and commercial assets such as 
credit card receivables, auto loan receivables, student loans, residential mortgages, trade 
receivables, commercial loans and leases, and equipment loans and leases. As the 
securitization of residential mortgages boomed beginning in 2000, so too did ABCP. 
Originators of mortgages, banks, and nonbanks like mortgage companies, sold the new 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 Many CP issuers bought credit default swaps from AIG whose concentration in the market was one factor in 
its near demise.  
9 This lack of detailed disclosure would contribute to the panic that spread through the markets once defaults 
began to increase in the subprime mortgage market resulting in runs, similar to the classic manifestation of a 
bank run. Because investors could not determine precisely if their ABCP contained subprime mortgages, they 
abandoned it rather than hold onto the risk. (See Gorton and Metrick 2012 discussing how the CP market panic 
was like a “bank run.”)  
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mortgages for cash that they re-lent. The purchased mortgages became part of pools backing 
ABCP, many which were relying on internal funding, i.e., that the existing paper would be 
rolled over to pay investors. 
When the mortgage market began to decline in 2007, some investors refused to rollover 
ABCP, requiring the SPV to fund cash payments. Soon thereafter, the devaluation of 
residential mortgage-backed securities meant that some conduits failed their “cushion tests” 
for internal funding requiring them to raise additional funds. Some had to sell into depressed 
markets and experienced losses. Although the direct impact of these developments was 
relatively small10, the panic that they incited was large, resulting in a $200 billion decline in 
ABCP in the month of August 2007. 
Figure 5: Commercial Paper Outstanding by Underlying Asset Type 
 2002 2006 2007 2008 
Consumer Assets     
Credit Card receivables 41.9 44.2 44.4 45.9 
Auto Loans and Leases 12.3 13.8 16.0 17.8 
Credit Cards 14.9 190.5 13.1 12.7 
Student Loans 1.0 4.2 7.2 8.5 
Residential Mortgages 8.2 11.3 4.8 4.4 
Other Consumer 5.5 4.3 3.1 2.4 
Commercial assets 51.5 43.3 54.8 44.9 
Trade Receivables 14.6 15.4 13.9 14.0 
Commercial Loans and Leases 6.6 12.4 13.6 12.9 
Equipment Loans and Leases 10.6 3.4 3.6 4.1 
Other Commercial 19.6 12.1 14.7 13.9 
Securities 6.6 12.5 9.7 10.1 
Total (percent) 100 100 100 100 





10 For example, 10 percent of ABCP issuers exercised an option extending maturities on their paper rather than 
redeem it. Also, between August 6 and 14, 2007 four conduits (representing 1.2 percent of ABCP outstanding) 
failed their cushion tests and liquidated their portfolios. In total between August 2007 and July 2008, 27 
conduits that relied on internal liquidity closed. (Anderson and Gascon 2009, 603). 
123




3. Crisis and the Role of the Money Market Mutual Funds 
August 2007—The ABCP Crisis 
MMMFs are regulated by the SEC and are subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
which generally restricts the investments that they may make to high-quality securities with 
maturities of less than 13 months.11 Beginning in the 1970s, MMMFs began to play an 
important role in the CP market. They would buy large-denominated CP, e.g., $100 billion, 
and then make it available to their retail customers in much smaller increments of, for 
example, $1,000. 
By August 2007, MMMFs were the largest holders of CP, accounting for $615.6 billion in 
outstanding CP, a full 38.5 percent, as shown on Figure 6 (Anderson and Gascon 2009, 596). 
MMMFs were also major holders of ABCP and as securities were downgraded, and as the 
market came under stress, they were challenged to maintain their $1 per share NAV. 
However, sponsors of at least 44 MMMFs impacted by distressed ABCP provided additional 
funding to their funds, overall investor outflows were modest, and no fund failed (McCabe 
2010, 8). 
2008 Developments—Lehman and the Reserve Primary Fund 
The CP markets, especially the ABCP market, struggled through the early part of 2008. After 
the fire sale of Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan Chase in March 2008 there were extensive rumors 
that Lehman Brothers was also on the brink of failure. Investors had to consider whether to 
sell Lehman Brothers CP that they owned at a loss or hold it in the hope that the firm would 
be rescued. 
On September 16, 2008, the day after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, The Reserve 
Primary Fund, a $62 billion prime MMMF, “broke the buck,”12 declaring a NAV of $0.97 per 
share and announcing a seven-day delay on paying redemptions. It attributed its actions to 
the need to write down its $785 billion (face value) position in Lehman CP. Within days, the 
fund suffered a staggering $40 billion in withdrawals, and it would ultimately have to 
suspend operations and liquidate. The failure of the Reserve fund’s sponsor to stabilize it, 
and the fund’s collapse shook investor confidence in sponsor support that had come to be 
presumed by the market, although not legally required. The damage soon spread to many 
funds, which also experienced runs by investors, which put them at risk. 
McCabe (2010) found that the financial crisis exposed three types of MMMF risks that had 
been overlooked because of the funds’ long history of stability: (1) portfolio risk, (2) investor 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
11 Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act requires that a fund’s portfolio must maintain a weighted average 
maturity of less than ninety days and that the fund cannot invest in more than 5 percent in any one issuer, 
except for government securities and repos. Eligible investments include CP, Repos, short-term bonds and 
other MMMFS. (Adrian, Kimbrough and Marchioni 2011, 28). 
12 Only two funds had previously broken the buck, the First Multifund for Daily Income in 1978, and the 
Community Bankers Government Money Market Fund in 1994 (Mamudi and Burton 2008). 
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risk and, (3) sponsor risk.13 With respect to sponsor risk, McCabe concluded that the system 
of sponsor support had created an aura of “guarantee” that investors relied upon. However, 
this mechanism was purely discretionary and had created a systemic risk for the MMMFs. 
Despite the prevailing perception, sponsors were not required to support their funds. 
Many sponsors stepped in to support funds experiencing losses after the initial shock to the 
ABCP market in 2007, sparing investors. When the Reserve Fund failed to back up its 
Primary Fund a year later, investor confidence was shaken. Institutional investors, which 
utilized MMMFs largely as bank-accounts, making frequent short-notice withdrawals, 
responded badly to the prospect that their funds might be unavailable. They withdrew their 
funds from prime MMMFs invested in CP, especially ABCP, and reallocated them into MMMFs 
that held only U.S. Treasuries (Anderson and Gascon 2010, 604). 
The redistribution was swift and significant. MMMFs received $117 billion in redemption 
requests during the week following Lehman’s bankruptcy. In the four weeks beginning on 
September 10, 2008, the assets of prime MMMFs dropped by $450 billion (21%) as investors 
fled to government-only funds; of this amount, $410 billion was pulled from funds marketed 
to institutions. 
Amid this widespread turmoil, 78 MMMFs received support from their sponsors in the form 
of cash contributions to the fund or the purchase of securities from the fund, sometimes at 
prices that exceeded fair market value. Of these 78 funds, the Fed reported that 21 of them 
would have “broken the buck” if they had not received this additional support. It is also 
possible that many more funds might have experienced continued troubles if the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) had not stepped in on September 19, 
2008 to guarantee MMMF accounts against losses resulting from a drop in a fund’s NAV 
below $0.995 per share (Henriques 2008).14 
Aftermath 
The runs on MMMFs made them reluctant to purchase CP, for fear that they might spark 
redemptions, and they began to decline rollovers when the CP they held matured. In the 
month following Lehman’s bankruptcy, outstanding CP declined by $300 billion, from $1.8 
trillion to $1.5 trillion, a drop of 16.6%. Seventy percent of this decline was a flight from 
financial CP and another 20% was withdrawal from the ABCP market, which still had not 
recovered from the prior year’s retreat. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
13 McCabe defined these as: (1) portfolio risks arising from the credit, liquidity, and interest-rate risks posed by 
a fund’s assets; (2) investor risk due to the composition of an MMF’s investors and the likelihood that they will 
suddenly and disruptively redeem shares; and (3) sponsor risk that reflects the possibility that an MMF sponsor 
will not provide financial support for an ailing fund (McCabe 2010,1). 
14 See US Treasury 9/29/2009 for details of the guarantee facility which operated similar to the FDIC guarantee 
of bank accounts, with each participating MMMF paying an upfront fee based on the number of shares 
outstanding and NAV as of September 19, 2008. The guarantee utilized the $50 billion Exchange Stabilization 
Fund, which would later prove a point of criticism.  
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As MMMFs retreated from the market, it became difficult for issuers to place CP. If MMMFs 
did accept CP, it was only at very short maturities, which enabled them to better manage risk, 
real or perceived. By the end of September 2008, 75 percent of CP (traditionally with 30+-
day maturities) was being rolled over daily creating enormous rollover risk (Andersen and 
Gascon, 606).15 This contraction in maturities was coupled with elevated rates, which 
increased sharply after September 2008, reflective of borrowers scrambling for funds in a 
constricted market. CP issuance declined by 24 percent in late 2008. (Adrian, Kimbrough, 
and Marchioni 2011, 29). As shown on Figure 2, the prolonged impact of this decline was 
significant, resulting in a $1 trillion reduction in outstanding ABCP between late 2007 and 
2009. 
The withdrawal of the MMMFs from buying term CP caused severe funding stresses on the 
issuers, the majority of which were financial institutions, which continuously needed tens of 
billions of dollars of CP to fund their highly leveraged operations. This circumstance in turn 
created increased pressure on the banks that the issuers would begin to draw down under 
credit lines. Investors thus also began to worry about the stability of the banks. If investors 
pulled away from many CP issuers, banks providing liquidity support would not be able to 
stand behind their guarantees, or the liquidity support would be exhausted and the sponsor 
of the conduits, often the same bank providing the liquidity support, would have to directly 
fund the CP conduit’s liquidity needs. 
An additional market stressor was that MMMFs holding significant portfolios of term CP 
were unable to sell assets to raise funds. If assets could be sold in a strained market, they 
would fetch only marginal prices. This would then put pressure on MMMF balance sheets as 
they might have to mark-to-market other assets held. 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
15 Notably, however, total issuance of CP and even ABCP decreased little, evidence that the crisis was one of 
liquidity with investors becoming unwilling to take risks for more than day at a time (Anderson and Gascon 
2010, 606). 
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Figure 6: Major Holders of Commercial Paper* 
 
*Data reported here are for open market paper, which contains both CP and bankers’ acceptances. CP comprises 85 
percent of open market paper over the sample and 99 percent since 1998. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds, Table L.208 , From Anderson & Gascon 2009. 
 
4. The Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Fund 
Mutual Liquidity Facility (AMLF) 
Beginning in September 2007, the Fed took steps to address the disruptions occurring in the 
funding markets by utilizing its traditional monetary policy tools to provide increased 
liquidity to depository institutions, and then to primary dealers (See Wiggins and Metrick 
2015A and Wiggins and Metrick 2015B, respectively.) There was real concern on the part of 
the Fed that the constricted markets might lead to contagion, cause systemic failure of the 
financial system, and then effect the real economy. 
When the money markets failed to recover, the Federal Reserve changed its approach from 
providing liquidity to specific types of entities and adopted several liquidity programs 
designed to support specific credit markets that had seized ⎯ the commercial paper market, 
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along with the asset securitization market,16 were the first of such markets. (See Figure 7 for 
significant dates.) 
Figure 7: Significant Dates Relating to the Commercial Paper Markets, 2007-10 
August 2007 Asset-backed commercial paper crisis 
September 15, 2008 Lehman Brothers announces bankruptcy 
September 16, 2008 Reserve Primary Fund “breaks the buck” pricing its shares at 97 
cents due to repricing of Lehman CP 
 Run on commercial paper/Run on money market mutual funds 
September 19, 2008 U. S. Treasury announces the Temporary Guarantee Program for 
MMFs 
 Federal Reserve announces the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) 
October 1, 2008 Maximum amount Outstanding under AMLF-$152 billion 
October 7, 2008 Federal Reserve announces the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF) 
January 28, 2009 Maximum Amount Outstanding under the CPFF-$351 billion 
May 8, 2009 Last borrowing under the AMLF 
October 13, 2009 Last AMLF borrowing matures 
February 1, 2010 AMLF Expired 
February 1, 2010 CPFF Expired 
April 26, 2010 Last CP purchased under CPFF matures 
August 30, 2010 CPFF LLC dissolved 
Source: Federal Reserve website; Federal Reserve Bank of New York website. 
 
Announced on September 19, 2008, the same day that the Treasury Department announced 
its guarantee of MMMFs accounts, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) provided nonrecourse loans to depository 
institutions17 and bank holding companies to purchase eligible high-quality ABCP from 
eligible MMMFs. 
The Federal Reserve Board minutes reflect that the Fed undertook this action for two 
reasons: (1) to assist MMMFs that held ABCP to meet demands for redemptions by investors 
and (2) to foster liquidity in the ABCP market. It took this action in light of the “severe 
difficulty in obtaining funding” that MMMFs were experiencing as “conditions in the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
16 See Wiggins and Metrick 2015E for an analysis of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
addressing the securitization market. 
17 Eligible AMLF lenders included U.S. depository institutions, U.S. bank holding companies, U.S. broker-dealer 
subsidiaries of such holding companies, and U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. When used in this 
discussion, depository institution or bank refers to all eligible institutions.  
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secondary market for ABCP were illiquid”18 (Fed. Res. Mins. Sept. 19, 2008). There was great 
concern that without additional liquidity in the credit markets, MMMFs would be forced to 
sell ABCP and other short-term assets into an illiquid market “resulting in a cycle of losses to 
MMMFs and even higher levels of redemptions and a weakening of investor confidence in 
MMMFs and the financial markets” (Fed. Res. website). 
Eligibility 
Loans made to depository institutions pursuant to the AMLF were fully collateralized by the 
purchased ABCP. A MMMF had to have experienced “material outflows”—defined as at least 
five percent of net assets in a single day or at least 10 percent of net assets within the prior 
five business days—before the ABCP that it sold could be eligible collateral for AMLF loans. 
Any ABCP purchased from a MMMF that had experienced material outflows could be pledged 
to the AMLF at any time within the five business days following the date that the threshold 
level of redemptions was reached if it satisfied eligibility requirements. 
Collateral 
Loans made under the AMLF were fully collateralized, but not over-collateralized. Unlike 
other programs, no haircut was applied to the ABCP purchased. Loans were also nonrecourse 
to the depository institution, which could hand over the ABCP if the borrowing MMMF 
defaulted. The risk that the value of the ABCP would decrease was born by the Fed, not the 
lending bank. Given this, the ABCP securing an AMLF loan had to meet certain eligibility 
criteria. Collateral eligible for the AMLF was limited to ABCP that: 
• was purchased by the borrower on or after September 19, 2008, from a registered 
investment company that held itself out as a MMMF and had experienced recent 
“material outflows;” 
• was purchased by the borrower at the mutual fund’s acquisition cost as adjusted for 
amortization of premium or accretion of discount on the ABCP through the date of its 
purchase by the borrower; 
• was not rated lower than A-1/P-1/F1 at the time it was pledged (paper that was rated 
A-1/P-1/F1, but was on watch for downgrade by any major rating agency, was 
excluded); 
• was issued by an entity organized under the laws of the United States or a political 
subdivision thereof under a program that was in existence on September 18, 2008; 
and 
• had a stated maturity that did not exceed 120 days if the borrower was a bank, or 270 
days if the borrower was a nonbank (Fed. Res. Aug. 2010). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
18 Later, fostering liquidity in the money markets more generally was also stated as a supporting reason. (See 
Fed Res. Aug. 2010, 31.) 
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Since it relied on the Federal Reserve’s emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the FRA, 
which permits it to make loans to any individual, partnership, or corporation, the Fed could 
have authorized the Federal Reserve banks to make loans directly to the MMMFs.19 However, 
the AMLF was structured as an indirect funding mechanism because of “statutory and fund-
specific limitations,” which prevented the MMMFs from borrowing directly from the Fed 
(Felkerson 2011, 22). 
The AMLF was administered by the Boston Federal Reserve Bank, which was authorized to 
make loans to eligible MMMFs in all 12 Federal Reserve Districts. The last borrowing under 
the AMLF occurred on May 8, 2009, and by October 13, 2009, all outstanding borrowings had 
matured; all were repaid in full with interest. The AMLF was originally established until 
January 30, 2009. It was later extended until February 1, 2010, at which point it expired. 
Complete data files regarding loans made pursuant to the AMLF are available at the Federal 
Reserve website at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_amlf.htm. 
Usage and Results 
Loans under the AMLF peaked at $150 billion shortly after its implementation in October 
2008. Fleming et al. (2009) considered the facility to have been successful in decreasing 
redemptions from MMMFs and in calming the stress in the CP markets by providing greater 
assurance to both issuers and investors that issuers would be able to roll over their maturing 
CP. Duygan-Bump et al. (2012) also concluded that the AMLF helped stabilize asset outflows 
from money market funds and reduced ABCP yields significantly. More specifically, they 
found that use of the AMLF was more likely by funds with larger redemption requests that 
held larger ABCP positions in their portfolios. They further found that the AMLF helped 
stabilize asset outflows from MMMFs with greater decreases occurring at funds that held 
more eligible collateral. In addition, they showed that yields on eligible ABCP decreased 
significantly relative to yields on comparable but ineligible paper. 
5. The Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
After the adoption of the AMLF, which applied only to ABCP held by MMMFs, the CP market 
in general continued to experience severe disruption. By October 2007, the market for term 
maturities had all but frozen, making it difficult for firms that relied on CP for their funding 
needs. To inject liquidity into the broader CP market and provide relief to the myriad of firms 
other than MMMFs that relied on this type of funding, on October 7, 2007, the FOMC 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
19 It did exactly this two weeks later on October 3, 2008, when it approved the Direct Money Market Mutual 
Fund Lending Facility (DMLF) which provided for direct lending to MMMMFs. After approval, consultation with 
market participants indicated that they would not use the facility, most likely because of “statutory and fund-
specific limitations” and the DMLF was rescinded by notation vote, dated October 10, 2008, without 
implementation (Fed. Res. Mins Oct. 3, 2008). The DMLF may be indicative of the Fed’s limited knowledge of 
MMMFs, a type of entity that it did not regularly deal with, or of the extreme pressure and urgency in which it 
was compelled to make decisions and design billion-dollar rescue facilities (Interview on File). 
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approved the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF). The CPFF in effect extended the 
Fed’s Discount Window lending to issuers of CP regardless of the type of entity. 
The legal memo supporting the CPFF indicated that it was based on the Fed’s Section 13(3) 
FRA emergency authority and that its purpose was to: 
“. . . provide liquidity to the CP market in coordination with the Federal Reserve’s 
existing credit facilities. The CPFF was designed to encourage investors to engage in 
term lending in the CP market, resulting in lower CP rates and increased demand for 
CP.” (Alvarez et al. 2009, 1) 
Because the CPFF was designed to offer funding beyond what was already available in the 
market, its focus became term lending and it offered 90-day loans, at the prime credit rate. 
The CPFF was available to “legacy issuers,” any company that had issued CP prior to its 
inception20, including those with a foreign parent.21 The maximum amount of CP that an 
issuer could sell to the CPFF—its Maximum Face Value22—was the maximum amount that 
the issuer had had outstanding between January 1 and August 31, 2008. CP eligible for 
purchase was only that rated A1/P1/F1 and could be unsecured or asset-backed. The Fed 
committed to hold the CP to maturity. 
Costs and Fees 
Eligible CP Issuers were required to preregister with the CPFF and pay a facility fee equal to 
10 basis points of its Maximum Face Value. A firm could register and delay utilization of the 
facility. 
A haircut was applied to the CP purchased. As shown on Figure 8, rates varied, between 100-
300 basis points over the overnight index swap rate, depending on whether the CP was 
secured or unsecured. The rates were set to discourage usage once market alternatives 
became available. Because the Fed had to be “secured to its satisfaction,” unsecured CP 
proved a challenge. To address this issue, a surcharge, equal to 100 basis points, was added 
to each transaction involving unsecured CP as a credit support fee. An issuer could avoid this 
fee by providing (1) a collateral arrangement for the CP, (2) obtaining an endorsement or 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
20 Later revision to the CPFF clarified that issuers that had an inactive CP program (i.e., one that had not issued 
CP for any period of three consecutive months or longer between January and August 31, 2008) could not revive 
such a program in order to utilize the CPFF (FRBNY Jan. 23, 2009). 
21 See discussion at page 21 discussing usage by subsidiaries of foreign corporations.  
22 The Maximum Face Value was calculated as the greatest amount of U.S. dollar-denominated A-1/P-1/F1 CP 
that the issuer had outstanding on any day between January 1 and August 31, 2008. The CPFF Registration 
Instructions also provided that—“If the Issuer has more than one commercial paper program, [the Maximum 
Face Value] should be the aggregate amount outstanding under all programs on a single day and all of the 
Issuer’s programs should be listed. . .. The Issuer agrees that while participating in this Facility, it will not sell 
commercial paper to the CPFF such that the total amount of commercial paper outstanding (including 
commercial paper held by the CPFF and other investors) would exceed the Maximum Face Value” (CPFF Issuer 
Registration Form and Qualification Certification). 
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guarantee for its CP obligations, or (3) by participating in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporations (“FDIC”) Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (“TLGP”) 
Figure 8: Applicable Fees under the CPFF 
Source: Federal Reserve Website. 
 
Design Challenges 
In establishing the CPFF the Federal Reserve was providing funding to entities beyond those 
covered by its traditional monetary powers, depository entities, and its primary dealers. 23 It 
had done this with the AMLF and had reached MMMFs by employing depository institutions 
as conduits, but that facility was limited to one type of highly-regulated entity. To be 
effective, the CPFF would have to be accessible to a wide range of CP issuers, a group that 
included financial and nonfinancial entities. 
Also, because the Fed would be dealing in a security that it did not normally handle, it had to 
build new legal, trading, investment, custodial, and administrative infrastructure as well as 
establish essential financial and operational risk controls (Adrian, Kimbrough, and 
Marchioni 2011, 30). 
As shown in Figure 9, to meet these challenges, the Fed established a new special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) to facilitate the CP purchases: CPFF LLC. The Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (FRBNY), which administered the CPFF, provided three-month loans to CPFF LLC. The 
LLC would then use the funds to purchase CP directly from eligible issuers. The FRBNY’s 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
23 The Fed’s normal authority includes loans of cash and securities to depository institutions and primary 
dealers as well as purchases and sales of U.S. Treasury and government agency securities.  
 
Type of Fee 
 
Type of CP 
 Unsecured ABCP 
Haircut 3-month overnight index swap 
rate (OIS) + 100 bp 
3-month overnight index swap rate 
(OIS) + 300 bp 
Credit 
Support 
100 bp on settlement as an 
insurance fee 
__ 
Total OIS + 200 bp OIS + 300 bp 
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loans were secured by all of the CPFF LLC’s assets including the CP that it purchased, fees 
that it collected, and any proceeds from investments. 




*Note: Solid lines represent steps in the transaction; dashed lines represent some of the 
controls. 
Source: Adrian et al. 2011, 31. 
Faced with a compressed time frame, the Fed hired Pacific Investment Management 
Company (PIMCO) and State Street Bank and Trust Company (State Street) to advise it in 
setting up the CPFF infrastructure. It utilized the primary dealers as agents. Since they 
actively underwrote, placed and made markets in CP, they were well suited to intermediate 
between the CP issuers and the Fed (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni, 2011, 31). Trades 
were cleared through the Depository Trust Company. This combination of existing and new 
infrastructure, and consultation with market experts, permitted the Fed to analyze a number 
of options in designing the facility such as fees, managing credit risk, hypothetical losses, and 
moral hazard,24 and still have the CPFF up and running by October 27, 2008, just 20 days 
after its announcement. 25 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
24 See Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011 for discussion of some of the analysis that went into the design 
of the CPFF. See also footnote 19 for a contrasting situation regarding the DMLF.  
25 By contrast, the AMLF was announced on September 19, 2008, and began operations on September 22. 
However, it must be considered that the AMLF was much less complex than the CPFF. It operated via a 
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At the time of its termination, the CPFF had accumulated approximately $5 billion in earnings 
from interest income, credit enhancement fees and registration fees (Bd. Gov. Report Aug. 
2010, 27). 
Complete data files regarding loans made to the SPV and purchases of CP pursuant to the 
CPFF are available at the Federal Reserve’s website, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_cpff.htm 
Usage and Impact of Facilities 
The first purchases by the CPFF occurred on October 27, 2008. Usage of the CPFF was 
aggressive, and it immediately had an impact on the CP markets. On the first day of operation, 
the CPFF purchased more than $50 billion of CP; in its first week, $144 billion. During the 
next few weeks, it purchased the overwhelming majority of newly issued three-month CP. 
Assets of CPFF LLC more than doubled after one month, reaching $293 billion, and reached 
$333 billion by the end of December 2008. The CPFF reached its peak of $350 billion (the 
maximum amount outstanding at any one time) during the third week of January 2009 when 
the CP first purchased by CPFF LLC matured and was rolled over. At this time, CPFF LLC 
owned 20 percent of all outstanding CP. Figure 10 illustrates the CPFF’s share of new issues 
and outstanding CP during its tenure. 
Figure 10: CPFF Share of Purchases and Outstanding Commercial Paper 
 
 
Source: FRB, H4.1 Table; Federal Reserve bank of New York. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
custodian bank, and lending occurred directly through the discount window. MMMFs sold ABCP to their 
custodian bank, which would subsequently pledge the ABCP to the discount window against a cash loan 
(Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011, 34). 
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Figure 11 shows the patterns of usage by the 82 issuers participating in the CPFF, which 
notably, included a number of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks.  
Figure 11-A: Maximum of Daily Outstanding Under the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility by Borrower—October 27, 2008 to January 25, 2010 (U.S. Million Dollars) 
 
Source: Kamakura Corporation and Federal Reserve. 
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Figure 11-B: Maximum of Daily Outstanding Under the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility by Borrower—October 27, 2008 to January 25, 2010 (U.S. Million Dollars) 
 
Source: Kamakura Corporation and Federal Reserve. 
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As market conditions improved, utilization of the CPFF waned (see Figure 12). By December 
2009 CPFF LLC held only $10 billion of assets, and the balance fell to zero by April 2010. The 
aggregate lent under the facility during its tenure was $737 billion. It was the third largest 
program (in terms of dollars expended) implemented by the Fed to combat the financial 
crisis. Only the Term Auction Facility and the U.S. dollar swaps with foreign central banks 
were larger. 
Figure 12: Commercial Paper Funding Facility Issuance 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
The CPFF expired on February 1, 2010. All loans that were made to CPFF LLC by the FRBNY 
were repaid in full in accordance with the terms of the facility, and all of the CP that CPFF 
LLC purchased was repaid in accordance with the respective stated terms. The last of the 
CPFF LLC’s CP holdings matured on April 26, 2010, and the LLC was dissolved on August 30, 
2010. The CPFF LLC accumulated nearly $5 billion in earnings, primarily from interest 
income, credit enhancement fees, and registration fees, which was paid to the FRBNY as 
managing member. 
Usage by Foreign Banks 
As Figure 11 shows, a wide variety of different types of entities did utilize the CPFF. Some of 
the largest and most prolific users were giants like Citibank, AIG, and General Motors, which 
also received additional funding from the government to stay afloat during the crisis. One 
fact that would come to light regarding the facilities employed by the Fed against the crisis, 
including the CPFF, was that a large percentage of the utilization was by U.S. subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. An analysis of the CPFF transaction data shows that on average, European 
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banks in aggregate had borrowings of $145.5 billion, 57.28% of the average outstanding 
borrowings under the CPFF. Not surprisingly, a number of banks that were experiencing 
well-reported difficulties were among the list of top borrowers including UBS, Dexia, SA26, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and Fortis SA/NA27 (VanDeventer, 2011). 
Impact 
In testifying before the U.S. House of Representatives, Chairman Ben Bernanke cited the 
impact of the CPFF as favorable—“[It has] allow[ed] many firms to extend significant 
amounts of funding into next year” resulting in “greater stability in the money market mutual 
funds and the Commercial Paper market.” (Bernanke 2008). Overall, the CPFF was one of the 
largest facilities instituted by the Federal Reserve in turns of usage and amounts committed 
in fighting the crisis. Only the Term Auction Facility28 and the U.S. dollar swaps29 with foreign 
central banks were larger. 
A report that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) received at its January 2009 
meeting described the impact of the Fed’s measures, including the CPFF, on the CP markets 
as follows: 
Conditions in the commercial paper (CP) market improved over the intermeeting 
period, likely reflecting recent measures taken in support of this market, greater 
demand from institutional investors, and the passing of year-end. Yields and spreads 
on 30-day A1/P1 nonfinancial and financial CP as well as on asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) declined modestly and remained low. Yields and spreads on 30-day 
A2/P2 CP, which is not eligible for purchase under the CPFF, dropped sharply after 
the beginning of the year as some institutional investors reportedly reentered the 
market. The dollar amounts of outstanding unsecured financial and nonfinancial CP 
and ABCP rose slightly, on net, over the intermeeting period. This small change was 
more than accounted for by the increase in CP held by the CPFF. In contrast, credit 
extended under the AMLF declined over the intermeeting period. (Fed. Res. Mins. Jan. 
27-28, 2009) 
In explaining the high usage of the CPFF Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni (2011) point to 
two factors: (i) its directness and (ii) its scope: 
“First, the CPFF addressed problems in short-term debt markets at their root—
through direct lending to issuers—at a time when issuers faced potential liquidity 
shortfalls as a result of market dislocations. Indeed, the main factor distinguishing the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
26 See Wiggins et al., Cross-border Resolution D: Dexia Group (2014). 
27 See Wiggins et al., Cross-border Resolution C: Fortis Group (2014). 
28 See Wiggins and Metrick, Federal Reserve Crisis Response B: Lending and Credit Programs for Primary 
Dealers (2016). 
29 See Wiggins and Metrick, Federal Reserve Crisis Response C: Providing U.S. Dollars to Foreign Central Banks 
(2016).  
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CPFF from the other two facilities [the AMLF and the MMIFF30] is the CPFF’s role as a 
backstop to issuers, whereas the other facilities provide emergency lending to 
institutional money market investors. Second, the CPFF backstopped issuance of both 
unsecured and secured commercial paper, while the AMLF funded only ABCP and the 
MMIFF special-purpose vehicles purchased only certificates of deposit, bank notes, 
and commercial paper from specific financial institutions. (Ibid., 34) 
 
6. The Federal Reserve’s Powers Under Section 13(3) of the FRA 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA) was enacted in 1932 so that the Fed would 
have some authority to respond if a rash of bank failures interrupted the ability of nonbanks 
to obtain credit, depressing the economy. The Fed can invoke Section13(3) to lend to an 
“individual, partnership, or corporation” if it finds that “unusual and exigent circumstances” 
exist, that the borrower does not have other means of credit available, and that the loans can 
be secured to the Fed’s satisfaction. 
In enacting the AMLF and the CPFF the Fed relied on its Section 13(3) authority based on its 
finding that the CP market was not functioning. This determination also provided a basis to 
support a further finding that unusual and exigent circumstances existed as well as the 
requirement that the borrower was unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from 
other banking institutions (Alvarez Memo Mar. 3, 2009). 
After the Lehman bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the Federal Reserve was faced with 
an escalating trauma that was multifaceted and interconnected, and its minutes show that it 
tasked itself with attacking the problem: 
As you all know, the Lehman bankruptcy led to sharp outflows from prime money 
market mutual funds into Treasury-only funds… The result was a collapse in Treasury 
bill yields. . . 
At the same time, the outflows from prime money market funds led to a sharp drop 
in the demand for commercial paper, a significant rise in commercial paper rates, and 
a shortening of commercial paper maturities (exhibits 4 and 5) . Term bank funding 
spreads rose sharply, with the one-month and three-month LIBOR–OIS spreads 
increasing to levels that make the earlier peaks look like modest speed bumps 
(exhibits 6and 7). The Lehman bankruptcy caused counterparty risk concerns to 
intensify. Moreover, the Lehman bankruptcy disrupted a number of markets because 
participants in these markets were uncertain how to adjust their long- and short-
position exposures that offset their open positions with Lehman. The result was a 
sharp drop in the willingness of counterparties to engage with one another, especially 
at term. Essentially, the result was a massive coordination problem that has led to a 
very unattractive equilibrium. I would put it this way: “I won’t lend to you even 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
30 See footnote 5. 
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though I think you’re okay because I am not sure others will lend to you either. I need 
some assurance that others will lend to you in order to have some assurance I can get 
my money back if I need it.” Even though it has been in the interest of all parties to 
engage, no party has been willing to go first. (FOMC Trans. Oct 28-29, 2008, 4) 
Foremost among the Fed’s concerns was the possible impact of the disruptions in the CP 
market on the real economy. Many financial intermediaries used CP to finance lending 
activities that were an integral part of their businesses and the difficulty in issuing CP sharply 
reduced their ability to provide new to firms and individuals. Evidence showed that there 
was a threat of severe restriction of lending not just to the financial system, but to the greater 
economy as well: residential mortgages, home equity lines, credit cards ,and other consumer 
loans (Ibid., 14). 
Months later Chairman Bernanke would comment on the lending markets that remained 
stalled despite the Fed’s aggressive provision of liquidity to banks and financial 
institutions— 
“concerns about capital, asset quality, and credit risk continue to limit the willingness 
of many intermediaries to extend credit, even when liquidity is ample. Moreover, 
providing liquidity to banks and financial institutions does not itself address directly 
instability or declining credit availability in critical nonbank markets such as the 
commercial paper market, or the market for asset-backed securities, both of which 
normally play major roles in the extension of credit in the United States.” (Bernanke 
Jan. 13, 2009) 
See also Porter (2009), 502-509, which provides an analytical discussion of the Fed’s 
utilization of its Section 13(3) powers during the financial crisis. 
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